



Striking a Balance among Security, Privacy and Competition.
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIP)
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Abstract: Following the ECJ decision that declared the Data Retention Directive invalid, the Data Retention and
Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIP) has been enacted. It is not undisputable whether the DRIP gives more
powers to the intelligence services at the detriment of both citizens’ privacy and freedom of enterprise or whether it
simply clarifies the nature and extent of obligations that can be imposed on telecommunications service providers
based outside the UK under Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA).
Il presente articolo si prefigge l’obiettivo di analizzare l’effettiva portata del Data Retention and Investigatory
Powers Act 2014, che è stato accusato di fornire nuovi poteri ai servizi segreti per controllare specialmente le
società straniere (ponendo, quindi, problemi di bilanciamento fra sicurezza, diritto alla riservatezza e libertà
d’impresa), mentre nelle intenzioni dichiarate dal Governo si tratterebbe semplicemente di chiarire poteri
preesistenti.
Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. The DRIP and the nature and extent of obligations that can be imposed on
telecommunications service providers based outside the UK – 2.1. Methodological flaws – 2.2. Some substantial
remarks – 3. The secondary legislation: The Data Retention Regulations 2014 – 4. The aftermath: R (David Davis
MP and Tom Watson MP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and the proposed Counter-Terrorism and
Security Bill – 5. Conclusion.
1. Introduction.
In an unprecedented hurry [1], in July 2014 the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIP or
DRIPA) [2] has been enacted. The occasio [3]of the act is the European Court of Justice Judgment of 8 April 2014
in joined cases C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland and C-594/12 Seitlinger, which declared the Data Retention
Directive (2006/24/EC) [4] invalid [5]. Consequently, the DRIP provides the powers to introduce secondary
legislation to replace the Data Retention Regulations 2009 (S.I. 2009/859) [6] that implemented the directive in
domestic law [7].
2. The DRIP and the nature and extent of obligations that can be imposed on telecommunications service
providers based outside the UK.
Anyway, what is more important from a comparative private law perspective is that the examined legislation
clarifies the nature and extent of obligations that can be imposed on telecommunications service providers [8]
based outside the UK under Part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) [9]. This Act ensures
that any company providing communication services to customers in the UK is obliged to comply with requests for
communications data [10] and interception warrants issued by the Secretary of State, irrespective of the location of
the company providing the service.
2.1. The DRIP has many methodological flaws and more nuanced substantial characteristics.
For what it concerns the first ones, the process that led to the production of this legislation has been described as
“a blot on our claim to be a democratic society” [11]. As is common knowledge, the UK Government could have
waited the European Institutions to harmonise the law after the Digital Rights Ireland – Seitlinger ruling, but the
situation has been considered an emergency.
First, if it were a proper emergency, waiting from April to July would have been very irresponsible. The truth is that
the investigations have gone on as always and there has not been any immediate effect of the European ruling at
hand [12].
Second, there has been no consultation. Better, allegedly the Government took into consideration the
communications industry, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as those affected by DRIP provisions”.
Nevertheless, the point is that it is not negligible that the citizens are, if not the first, for sure among the primary
subjects of the mentioned legislation [13].
More in general, the behaviour of the Government appears to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. It is an
emergency so it is not important to wait for an act of the European Institutions (even though it could happen that
the DRIP conflicts with the forthcoming EU legislation), but at the same time the Government adds a sunset
clause, which has the effect of keeping this law in place for twenty-nine months. It is reasonable to ask oneself
how can “a review in 30 months be adequate (30 weeks would be a long time), especially when it is clear that
Parliament has little business to deal with between now and the election?” [14].
2.2. Some substantial remarks.
Let’s move to the content. In the Digital Rights Ireland – Seitlinger judgement, the ECJ declares the Directive
2006/24 invalid because it required the telecommunications service providers to retain for up to two years all
meta-data about emails, text messages and telephone calls of every EU citizen and to make these available to
national security agencies. This was found in contrast with the rights to privacy and data protection consecrated in
the Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union.
Despite the hurry, the solution taken by the Government appears to be quite well balanced. On the one hand, in
fact, the DRIP allows the security services to require a public telecommunications operator to retain
communications data in line with the purposes of the RIPA. On the other hand, it limits the length of time such data
can be retained to a maximum of twelve months [15], reduces the number of public bodies that can access the
data collected, creates a privacy and civil liberties board to oversee the enforcement of the DRIP, provides the
annual publication of a report on the amount of data intercepted and other less relevant provisions [16].
It is clear, nevertheless, that the statement that the Bill does not contain new powers is false. On this point, I
espouse the Open letter on data retention and investigatory powers Bill  (“DRIP”) from UK privacy law
academics of 10th July 2014 [17].
The Government is indeed authorised to compel any person or company outside the UK: i. To execute an
interception warrant (also relating to conduct outside the UK) (4(2)); ii. To do anything, including complying with
technical requirements, to ensure the ability, on a continuing basis, to assist the UK with interception at any time
(4(6)); iii. To obtain, retain and disclose communications data also relating to conduct outside the UK (4(8)).
Something is new under the sun: no extraterritorial effect was provided by the RIPA [18], now extraterritoriality is
not negligible anymore.
Furthermore, it is true that the Secretary of State can only require retention of the same types of communications
data that he could under the 2009 Regulations, but he may however “also make regulations which relate to the
wider category of communications data retained by service providers under the voluntary code of practice under
ACTSA, s 102” [19].
It is, eventually, been noted that the DRIP “does not meet the terms of the CJEU decision and breaches the
Human Rights Act 2000 and the Charter Rights” [20].
3. The secondary legislation: The Data Retention Regulations 2014.
On 1st August 2014, the Data Retention Regulations 2014 came into force [21], completing the framework
introduced by the DRIP. They provide that a communications service provider can be required to retain data only
when target of a notice of the Secretary of State.
4. The aftermath: R (David Davis MP and Tom Watson MP) v Secretary of State for the Home
Department and the proposed Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill.
There has already been an important occasion when the High Court judged on the DRIP. In a nutshell, the case
had been brought by two Members of Parliament, with the intervention of the human rights activists of Open
Rights Group (ORG) and Privacy International (PI) [22] seeked an order disapplying section 1 of the DRIP for
breach of the Directive on privacy and electronic communications 2002/58/EC (“PECD”).
In December 2014, in R (on the application of David Davis MP and Tom Watson MP) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [23], Mr Justice Lewis granted the Claimants permission to proceed to a substantive hearing,
thus agreeing that the DRIP can be challenged by judicial review.
As a reaction [24], the Government is proposing to use the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (CTSB) [25] to
extend their remit to cover data generated as a result of internet communications. In fact, part 3 of the CTSB deals
with the data retention: what is more important is not that clause 17 amends the DRIP, but the point is that security
and the battle to terrorism are once again used to restrict people’s privacy. This is meaningful not only from an
axiological point of view, but also from a programmatic one, as art. 1 PECD provides for an individual right to
confidentiality, erasure and anonymity of one’s ‘communications’ or ‘traffic data,’ specifying the obligations of the
Member States in the following articles, which can be derogated  from Article 15 PECD, by which Member States
can exceptionally restrict the mentioned rights when “necessary, appropriate and proportionate [...] to safeguard
national security (i.e State security), defence, public security, and the prevention, investigation, detention and
prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communications system”.
5. Conclusion.
It appears clear the difference between the UK approach and the EU one. It is sufficient to read the Article 29
Working Party Data Protection Group Opinion 5/2002 [26] where it is provided that retention of traffic data for
purposes of law enforcement should meet strict conditions under Article 15 (1) of the Directive: i.e. in each case
only for a limited period and where necessary, appropriate and proportionate in a democratic society. Where traffic
data are to be retained in specific cases, there must therefore be a demonstrable need, the period of retention
must be as short as possible and the practice must be clearly regulated by law, in a way that provides sufficient
safeguards against unlawful access and any other abuse. In conclusion, “systematic retention of all kinds of traffic
data for a period of one year or more would be clearly disproportionate and therefore unacceptable in any case”
[27].
As a matter of fact, in conclusion, the DRIP introduces “powers that are not only completely novel in the United
Kingdom, they are some of the first of their kind globally” and applies it to a very wide target, so the above-
mentioned counterweights risk to be a red herring. Eventually, with the purpose (or with the excuse, some might
dare to say) of protecting privacy (which is in fact violated by the Secretary of State allegedly for security reasons),
the freedom of enterprise is left to bite the dust [28].
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